
Douglas B. White, MD, MAS; Mitchell H. Katz, MD; John M. Luce, MD; and Bernard Lo, MD

A public health emergency, such as an influenza pandemic, will lead to shortages of mechanical ventilators, critical care beds, and other potentially life-saving treatments. Difficult decisions about who will and will not receive these scarce resources will have to be made. Existing recommendations reflect a narrow utilitarian perspective, in which allocation decisions are based primarily on patients’ chances of survival to hospital discharge. Certain patient groups, such as the elderly and those with functional impairment, are denied access to potentially life-saving treatments on the basis of additional allocation criteria. We analyze the ethical principles that could guide allocation and propose an allocation strategy that incorporates and balances multiple morally relevant considerations, including saving the most lives, maximizing the number of “life-years” saved, and prioritizing patients who have had the least chance to live through life’s stages. We also argue that these principles are relevant to all patients and therefore should be applied to all patients, rather than selectively to the elderly, those with functional impairment, and those with certain chronic conditions. We discuss strategies to engage the public in setting the priorities that will guide allocation of scarce life-sustaining treatments during a public health emergency.

Decision Making During a Public Health Emergency

In everyday clinical practice, patients who require life-sustaining treatments receive them, except if they or their surrogates decline the treatments or in the rare circumstance that they are deemed medically futile (11). This reflects the primacy of respect for patient autonomy in U.S. health care ethics and law, as well as the general availability of life support (12, 13). Physicians do not unilaterally withdraw mechanical ventilation against a patient’s wishes in order to provide it to someone else.

Public health ethics differs from clinical ethics by giving priority to promoting the common good over protecting individual autonomy. The physician’s primary duty in clinical medicine is to promote the well-being of individual patients (14), but a shortage of ventilators in a public health emergency may require physicians to withhold or withdraw mechanical ventilation against their own clinical intuitions and against the wishes of some patients who otherwise might survive. Public health policies, which focus primarily on population-level health outcomes, may

See also:

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subordinate the interests and rights of individuals to the common good (15, 16). The clinical scenario presented in Table 1 highlights the dilemmas that may arise during a public health emergency if there are not enough mechanical ventilators to treat the patients who need them.

Although several strategies are used for allocating scarce medical resources (Table 2), the notion that public health measures could shape life-or-death choices for all critically ill patients is foreign to most clinicians and patients. During a public health emergency, allocation decisions will be the responsibility of state public health departments, with federal guidance and support. In most states, the governor has the authority to declare a public health emergency, which then triggers public health police powers, including rationing of vaccines and medicines (10, 20). Individual health care systems, hospitals, and clinicians cannot set public health policy but will need to implement allocation decisions under the authority of public health departments. Several other groups have suggested strategies to promote collaboration between public health officials and front-line clinicians, including training individual clinicians to function as triage officers under the supervision of public health officials (7–9).

**Critique of Existing Guidelines**

Historically, allocation decisions in public health have been driven by the utilitarian goal of accomplishing the “greatest good for the greatest number” (15). Although this broad principle can be interpreted many ways, several recent guidelines for allocating life support during a public health emergency have specified it narrowly as “maximize the number of people who survive to hospital discharge” (7–9). We believe that this allocation strategy does not adequately incorporate other morally relevant considerations.

In addition, these published guidelines deny access to life support to certain patient groups who could potentially benefit from treatment. For example, 1 group advocates denying access to ventilatory support to persons who are functionally dependent from neurologic impairment (6). Another group recommends excluding persons older than 85 years and persons with New York Heart Association class III or IV heart failure (7, 9). These exclusions are not explicitly justified. Moreover, they are ethically flawed because the criteria for exclusion (age, long-term prognosis, and functional status) are selectively applied to some types of patients, rather than to all patients who require life-sustaining interventions. Such selective application violates the principle of justice because patients who are similar in ethically relevant ways are treated differently. Categorical exclusion may also have the unintended negative effect of implying that some groups are “not worth saving,” leading to perceptions of unfairness. In a public health emergency, public trust will be essential to ensure compliance with restrictive measures. Thus, an allocation system should make clear that all individuals are “worth saving.” One way to do this is to keep all patients who would receive mechanical ventilation during routine clinical circumstances eligible, but allow the availability of ventilators to determine how many eligible patients receive it.

**What Principles Should Guide Allocation?**

The utilitarian rule of maximizing the number of lives saved is widely accepted during a public health emergency (21). The Ontario and New York state working groups both propose modifying a relatively simple mortality prediction model—the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment score (22)—to determine an individual’s priority. No compelling evidence suggests that 1 mortality prediction model will be more accurate than another, but the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment score is the easiest to implement and requires the fewest laboratory tests. Although existing models are imperfect, they are as accurate as physicians’ prognostic estimates (23) and have the added appeal of being objective and transparent. Prioritizing treatment of individuals according to their chances for short-term survival also avoids ethically irrelevant considerations, such as race or socioeconomic status. Finally, it is appealing because it balances utilitarian claims for efficiency with egalitarian claims that because all lives have equal value, the goal should be to save the most lives (21).

However, using the probability of short-term survival as the sole allocation principle is problematic. It is hazardous to extrapolate mortality prediction models beyond the conditions for which they have been validated (23, 24). Perhaps because of this concern, existing guidelines recommend using the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. When the Demand for Ventilators Overwhelms the Supply</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An influenza pandemic has caused severe shortages of ventilators and other life-saving resources in the United States. All critical care beds in the hospital in question are occupied by patients receiving mechanical ventilation, many of whom have respiratory failure from influenza. Patients are receiving mechanical ventilation in step-down units, and all nonemergency surgical cases have been canceled. Despite these measures, all but 1 of the hospital’s ventilators are being used by patients who would die without them. All hospitals in the region are experiencing the same shortages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which of the following 3 patients should be prioritized for the 1 available ventilator?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A previously healthy 44-year-old man with sepsis and multiorgan failure. His SOFA score is 12, predicting a roughly 30% chance of survival to discharge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An 83-year-old man with severe peripheral vascular disease and severe, inoperable coronary artery disease. His SOFA score is 10, predicting a roughly 50% chance of survival to hospital discharge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 32-year-old woman with severe primary pulmonary hypertension (pulmonary artery pressure, 55 mm Hg) who was intubated after an accidental overdose of narcotics and benzodiazepines. Her SOFA score is 4, predicting a roughly 90% chance of survival to discharge.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOFA = Sequential Organ Failure Assessment.
only to stratify people into 4 prognostic groups, rather than to make finer distinctions among patients. On the basis of current experience with avian influenza, many patients with respiratory failure probably will also develop multiorgan failure (25). Thus, there probably will be large clusters of patients who are indistinguishable on the basis of their prognoses for short-term survival.

Ethically, using only chance of survival to hospital discharge is insufficient because it rests on a thin conception of “accomplishing the greatest good.” We discuss additional principles that have been used in other situations to allocate scarce medical resources. We argue that 2 of these principles should be combined with the principle of “saving the most lives” to create a multiprinciple strategy to allocate scarce life-saving resources during a public health emergency.

**Broad Social Value**

Broad social value refers to one’s overall worth to society. It involves summary judgments about whether a person’s past and future contributions to society’s goals merit prioritization for scarce resources (21). When dialysis was first introduced, social value was a key consideration in allocating scarce dialysis machines. Patients who were professionals, heads of families, and caregivers received priority over “creative non-conformists who rub the bourgeoisie the wrong way” (26). The public firestorm in response to revelations that social worth was a key factor in the Seattle Dialysis Committee’s deliberations partly led Congress to authorize universal coverage for hemodialysis (27).

In our morally pluralistic society, it has not been possible to agree on a set of criteria to assert that 1 person is intrinsically more worthy of saving than another. Even if such consensus could be reached, some philosophers argue that it should not be a guiding principle for allocation decisions. These individuals defend the egalitarian view that all individuals have an equal moral claim to treatment and that it should not be a guiding principle for allocation decisions. These individuals defend the egalitarian view that it should not be a guiding principle for allocation decisions. These individuals defend the egalitarian view that all individuals have an equal moral claim to treatment. These individuals defend the egalitarian view that all individuals have an equal moral claim to treatment regardless of whether they can contribute measurably to broad social goals (28). Childress (29) writes that one’s “dignity as a person... cannot be reduced to his past or future contribution to society.” Given the lack of an accepted specification of broad social value and the sharp disagreement about whether it is a relevant consideration, we do not recommend using this principle to guide allocation of life support during a public health emergency.

**Instrumental Value: The “Multiplier Effect”**

Instrumental value refers to a person’s ability to carry out a specific function that is essential to prevent social disintegration or a great number of deaths during a time of crisis. It has also been described as “narrow social utility” and the “multiplier effect” (21, 30). The National Vaccine Advisory Committee recommends this principle to allocate vaccines and antiviral medications during a pandemic (31). It gives first priority to workers in vaccine manufacturing and to health care providers. The ethical justification is that prioritizing certain key individuals will achieve a “multiplier effect,” through which many more lives are ultimately saved by their work.

Instrumental value must be distinguished from judgments about broad social worth. With instrumental value, persons are prioritized not because they are judged to hold more “intrinsic worth,” but because of their ability to perform a specific task that is essential to society. In this sense, instrumental value is a derivative allocation principle; it is desirable because it ensures an adequate workforce to achieve public health goals. Even critics of allocation based on broad social value accept the use of instrumental value in certain circumstances (28).

However, using instrumental value to allocate ventilators may be ethically problematic for some public health emergencies, such as an influenza pandemic, which probably will be short and leave individuals with illnesses that require a long recovery. In general, to justify a restrictive public health measure, good evidence must suggest that the measure is necessary and will be effective (20). It seems unlikely that persons with respiratory failure from influenza would recover in time to reenter the workforce and

### Table 2. Examples of Existing Allocation Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Allocation Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of ICU beds during routine clinical circumstances</td>
<td>First-come, first-served</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treating the wounded on battlefields</td>
<td>Regardless of rank, first treat soldiers with life-threatening injuries who are most likely to survive (17).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributing limited supplies of intravenous fluid during cholera epidemics in refugee camps</td>
<td>Give fluids to persons with moderate dehydration who will probably recover with small amounts of fluid (rather than to those with the most advanced dehydration, who may or may not survive) (18).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation of lungs for transplantation</td>
<td>Balance the patients’ medical needs, defined by how likely they are to die within 1 year without transplantation, with their likelihood of benefit, defined as how likely they are to be alive 1 year after transplantation (19). *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation of livers for transplantation</td>
<td>Prioritize persons most likely to die without transplantation (using the Model for End-Stage Liver Disease score). *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ICU = intensive care unit.

* Some patients are deemed ineligible to be listed for transplantation on the basis of medical factors (such as severe comorbid conditions) and social factors (such as ongoing substance abuse or an inadequate social support structure).
fulfill their instrumental roles. Moreover, it is not clear which roles are truly indispensable to saving a large number of lives during a pandemic. Because of the uncertainty about which key personnel will be in short supply and whether they will recover in time to achieve their instrumental value, we do not recommend that this principle be incorporated at this stage of planning. However, this principle should be openly debated with the public and “held in reserve” if convincing evidence emerges that its use would minimize mortality in a particular public health emergency.

Several other allocation principles can be rejected without extensive discussion. The “first-come, first-served” and “sickest first” principles are inconsistent with the public health goal of achieving the greatest good for the greatest number of persons (32, 33). Maximizing quality-adjusted life-years or disability-adjusted life-years would not be feasible to implement during a public health crisis because of the complexity of measuring these attributes. We next turn to 2 principles that can and, we contend, should be combined with the principle of “saving the most lives” to allocate life-saving resources during a public health emergency.

Maximizing Life-Years

A broader conceptualization of accomplishing the “greatest good” is to consider the years of life saved in addition to the number of lives saved. Assuming equal chances of short-term survival, giving priority to a 60-year-old woman who is otherwise healthy over a 60-year-old woman with a limited life expectancy from severe comorbid conditions will result in more “life-years” gained. The justification for incorporating this utilitarian claim is simply that, all other things being equal, it is better to save more years of life than fewer.

The principle of maximizing life-years was recently incorporated into the strategy to allocate lungs for transplantation. Rather than simply aiming to save the most lives, the lung allocation system now balances patients’ medical need (prognosis without transplantation) against their expected duration of survival after transplantation (19). We contend that explicitly adding considerations of “maximizing life-years saved” to “saving the most lives” yields a more complete specification of accomplishing the greatest good for the greatest number. Although current guidelines use this principle to exclude certain subgroups of patients from access to treatment, we think that this principle is relevant to all patients, not just those with extremely limited life expectancies. Moreover, applying it to all patients rather than an unfortunate few promotes consistency and fairness.

The Life-Cycle Principle

Under the life-cycle principle, the goal is to give each individual an equal opportunity to live through the various phases of life (34). This principle has been called the “fair innings” argument and “intergenerational equity” (35). In practical terms, the life-cycle principle gives relative priority to younger individuals over older individuals. There is a precedent for incorporating life-cycle considerations into pandemic planning. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ plan to allocate vaccines and antivirals during an influenza pandemic prioritizes infants and children over adults (31). The ethical justification of the life-cycle principle is that it is a valuable goal to give individuals equal opportunity to pass through the stages of life—childhood, young adulthood, middle age, and old age (34). The justification for this principle does not rely on considerations of one’s intrinsic worth or social utility. Rather, younger individuals receive priority because they have had the least opportunity to live through life’s stages.

Empirical data suggest that, when individuals are asked to consider situations of absolute scarcity of life-sustaining resources, most believe younger patients should be prioritized over older ones (36). Harris (37) summarizes the moral argument in favor of life-cycle-based allocation as follows: “[I]t is always a misfortune to die . . . it is both a misfortune and a tragedy [for life] to be cut off prematurely.”

Some critics contend that the life-cycle principle unjustly discriminates against older persons. However, this principle is inherently egalitarian because it seeks to give all individuals equal opportunity to live a normal life span. It applies the notion of equality to individuals’ whole lifetime experiences rather than just to their current situation (35). Unlike prioritization based on sex or race, everyone faces the prospect of aging and everyone hopes to move through all stages of life (34).

Can Multiple Principles Be Incorporated Into an Allocation Strategy?

Past success in developing multiprinciple allocation systems for organ transplantation suggests that this is a feasible endeavor (19). However, during a public health crisis, there will be little time for complex algorithms. Undoubtedly, there will be a tension between creating an allocation strategy that reflects the moral complexity of the issue and one that can be feasibly implemented. We propose an alternative to the single-principle strategy proposed by previous working groups—one that strives to incorporate and balance saving the most lives, saving the most life-years, and giving individuals equal opportunity to live through life’s stages.

Table 3
describes an example of a very basic approach to specifying and incorporating these 3 principles into an allocation strategy. It is meant to be illustrative rather than definitive. Each principle is assessed on a 4-point scale. Individual patients are evaluated on the basis of their likelihood for short-term survival, presence of comorbid conditions that would limit the duration of benefit, and phase of life. Patients with the lowest cumulative score would receive the highest priority for scarce, life-sustaining technologies. We make no claim that this specific, unweighted
point system is the optimal way to balance and translate these 3 allocation principles into practice. Another approach is to treat each principle as a continuous variable and weigh each one according to judgments about its relative importance. Complex value judgments underlie decisions to weigh principles differently or arrange them hierarchically. Although these value judgments ultimately must be made, the first step—which is the goal of our article—is to establish that there are several relevant allocation principles. Thereafter, we should engage key stakeholders to determine how to fairly balance these principles.

To illustrate how the proposed multiprinciple system leads to different allocation decisions compared with the “save the most lives” approach, consider the vignette presented in Table 1. By using the “save the most lives” strategy proposed by New York state, Ontario, and the Critical Care Initiative, the 83-year-old man with a 50% chance of hospital survival but multiple life-limiting comorbid conditions (which are not on the proposed lists of categorically excluded diseases) would receive highest priority. Even though the previously healthy 44-year-old man has a much better long-term prognosis and has had the least opportunity to live through life’s stages, he is ranked less favorably because of his slightly worse prognosis for survival to hospital discharge. The woman with primary pulmonary hypertension and an accidental overdose would categorically be denied ventilation because of the severity of her pulmonary disease, even though the basis for that disqualification is not clearly justified in any of the proposals. Her case highlights the mistaken assertion that patients with severe comorbid conditions should be categorically denied life support on the grounds that they will always have poor intensive care unit outcomes.

In contrast, the multiprinciple allocation strategy we propose would result in priority going to the 32-year-old patient with pulmonary hypertension with a 90% chance of short-term survival. She is prioritized above the other 2 patients because of the combination of her excellent chances for short-term survival and her young age (total allocation score, 5). The previously healthy 44-year-old patient with no comorbid conditions and a 30% chance of short-term survival (total allocation score, 6) is prioritized over the 83-year-old man with severe comorbid conditions and 50% chance of short-term survival (total allocation score, 11) even though the younger man has a worse prognosis for short-term survival. Although not relevant in these sample cases, patients with identical allocation scores should be viewed as having equal moral claims to receive life support. In such a circumstance, a lottery is a reasonable approach to determine which patient will receive priority.

Some may criticize the proposed multiprinciple system as overpenalizing older individuals, who are more likely to have more comorbid conditions and to have lived through life’s stages. However, the multiprinciple system we propose draws an important distinction between healthy older adults and older adults with life-limiting comorbid conditions. This approach avoids using age as a “blunt” predictor of years of life remaining. Rather than overpenalizing older adults for the correlation between age and comorbid conditions, our system avoids “penalizing” healthy older adults. Others may criticize such a system for relying on probabilities of outcomes that may not accurately predict what will happen to any individual. We acknowledge that any probabilistic scoring system cannot perfectly predict outcomes for individual patients. This concern has limited the use of probabilistic scoring systems to make treatment decisions during routine clinical practice (11). However, the rationale for their use is stronger during a public health emergency, when the goal is to maximize population-level outcomes. Such an objective approach may also be viewed

### Table 3. Illustration of a Multiprinciple Strategy to Allocate Ventilators During a Public Health Emergency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Save the most lives</td>
<td>Prognosis for short-term survival (SOFA score)</td>
<td>SOFA score &lt; 6</td>
<td>SOFA score, 6–9</td>
<td>SOFA score, 10–12</td>
<td>SOFA score &gt; 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the most life-years</td>
<td>Prognosis for long-term survival (medical assessment of comorbid conditions)</td>
<td>No comorbid conditions that limit long-term survival</td>
<td>Minor comorbid conditions with small impact on long-term survival</td>
<td>Major comorbid conditions with substantial impact on long-term survival</td>
<td>Severe comorbid conditions; death likely within 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life-cycle principle†</td>
<td>Prioritize those who have had the least chance to live through life’s stages (age in years)</td>
<td>Age 12–40 y</td>
<td>Age 41–60 y</td>
<td>Age 61–74 y</td>
<td>Age ≥ 75 y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOFA = Sequential Organ Failure Assessment.
* Persons with the lowest cumulative score would be given the highest priority to receive mechanical ventilation and critical care services.
† Pediatric patients may need to be considered separately, because their small size may require the use of different mechanical ventilators and personnel.
by the public as fairer than decisions based on more subjective criteria.

Although more complex than the previously proposed single-principle allocation system, this multiprinciple allocation system better reflects the diverse moral considerations relevant to these difficult decisions. In addition, this approach avoids the need to categorically deny treatment to certain groups, a problem that one legal scholar calls a “political and legal minefield” (38).

The Need for Meaningful Public Engagement

In our pluralistic society, people will probably disagree over which principles should guide allocation of ventilators during a pandemic. Therefore, careful attention to procedural justice becomes very important. Daniels and Sabin (39, 40) identified several aspects of procedural justice that should be followed when allocating scarce health care resources: public engagement, transparency in decision making, appeals to rationales and principles that all can accept as relevant, oversight by a legitimate institution, and procedures for appealing and revising individual decisions in light of challenges to them.

Public involvement is essential because deciding which principles will guide allocation of life-saving resources during a public health emergency is a value judgment rather than an expert scientific judgment. Citizens’ values are crucial in this process because the public will bear the consequences of triage decisions (15). Public input has been useful for developing allocation policies for influenza vaccines and organs for transplantation (41). The public input for lung transplantation revealed fundamental differences in the attitudes of policymakers and the public, both of which ultimately shaped the allocation system (19).

Striving for a fair process of decision making may also enhance public trust (10, 42). If citizens perceive the process of setting priorities as unfair, they may challenge the legitimacy of the public health response and not adhere to restrictive measures. Public engagement may be especially important during a public health emergency because another important aspect of procedural justice—an individual’s right to a due process appeals mechanism—will be severely limited by the urgency of individual decisions (39).

To date, public involvement in the debate over allocation of limited resources in a public health emergency has not occurred. The proposals from the Critical Care Initiative and the Ontario working group were developed without broad public input (7). In New York state, only after clinicians and policymakers determined their recommendations did they post the 52-page document on a Web site for public comment (8). Because most individuals have not considered the possibility of ventilator scarcity during a pandemic and may not understand the range of potential allocation strategies, simple elicitation of comments is insufficient to allow informed public participation. Moreover, involving the public after the bulk of work on the policy has been completed reduces the likely impact of public comments. These represent serious deficiencies in both how and when public engagement occurs.

We propose 3 modifications to the process of public engagement that are feasible and methodologically rigorous. First, public engagement should occur before writing a draft policy, as well as after a draft is proposed. Second, the public needs adequate background information in order to be informed. Policymakers and ethicists should first delineate the range of feasible, ethically defensible allocation strategies, then collaborate with communication experts and social scientists to explain them to the public, including those of limited English proficiency and health literacy. Third, policymakers should engage a representative sample of citizens, rather than those with the knowledge and resources to seek out the draft guidelines on the Internet. This can be accomplished with research techniques from clinical and market research, such as in-depth qualitative interviews and focus groups. Focusing on community members rather than political or religious leaders may minimize the likelihood that the public engagement process will be dominated or co-opted by special interest groups. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, have established procedures for public consultation on controversial health policies (43).

Table 4. Summary of Recommendation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles to guide allocation of scarce resources in a public health emergency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Principles guiding allocation decisions should include maximizing survival to hospital discharge, maximizing the number of life-years saved, and maximizing individuals’ chances to live through each of life’s stages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. If it seems likely that there will be a severe shortage of providers of a key service and that personnel will recover in time to be useful, it is ethically permissible to incorporate considerations of instrumental value into prioritization considerations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating a fair process of decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The public should be engaged early in the process of choosing among ethically permissible allocation strategies, both to identify the most acceptable approach and to achieve to the greatest possible extent a fair process of decision making.</td>
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Conclusion

Unresolved ethical and practical dilemmas about allocating ventilators and critical care resources could threaten the success of the response to a public health emergency. We contend that the previously proposed “save the most lives” allocation strategy is insufficient because it fails to incorporate morally relevant considerations, such as the expected years of life saved and the importance of giving individuals equal opportunity to pass through life’s stages. We propose an alternative, multiprinciple allocation strategy that better reflects the moral complexity of the issue and applies the same allocation criteria to all patients (Ta-
ble 4). We hope that our proposal will stimulate a broad debate about how to ethically allocate scarce life-sustaining resources during a public health emergency.

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Potential Financial Conflicts of Interest: Consultancies: B. Lo (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Ethics Subcommittee to Advisory Committee to Director).

Grant Support: By grant KL2 RR024130 from the National Center for Research Resources, a component of the NIH and NIH Roadmap for Medical Research and by the Greenwall Foundation.

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